Monday, October 13, 2014

NO A LA CONSULTA DEL 9N EN CATALUÑA

(CNN Español) - El gobierno de Cataluña descartó realizar la consulta soberanista programada para el 9 de noviembre y plantearía un proceso de participación ciudadana alternativo.
“El Gobierno (de Cataluña) ha constatado que la consulta, de acuerdo con el decreto (firmado para realizarla), no se puede hacer. Hemos planteado una alternativa de movilización y cuantificable. El Gobierno hará una propuesta mañana”, dijo el líder de Iniciativa Per Catalunya, Carles Herrera, a la salida de la reunión que el presidente de la Generalitat Artur Mas sostuvo con los partidos que apoyan el referéndum.
Mas comparecerá este martes para dar detalles de su propuesta.
Según medios españoles, la nueva iniciativa del presidente catalán incluiría otro tipo de proceso de participación ciudadana para conocer la opinión de los catalanes sobre el futuro político de la comunidad autónoma.
El partido Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya —principal impulsor de la consulta junto al partido de Mas— dijo en un comunicado que "el Gobierno catalán nos sitúa en un escenario de participación nuevo y no pactado, que en ningún caso puede sustituir la consulta del 9 de noviembre”.
Para Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, es necesario "construir una mayoría parlamentaria para hacer una declaración de independencia e iniciar el proceso constituyente de la República Catalana”.
A finales de septiembre, el gobierno catalán puso en pausa la campaña para la consulta soberanista después de que el Tribunal Constitucional de España suspendiera de forma cautelar el referéndum al admitir los recursos presentados por el gobierno del presidente Mariano Rajoy.
Dada la presión jurídica del tribunal, el gobierno catalán acordó detener la campaña institucional sobre la consulta, pero en ese entonces mostró interés en apelar para intentar levantar la suspensión.
"Hay un gobierno [central] claramente hostil contra lo que está haciendo la mayoría del pueblo de Cataluña", dijo el 30 de septiembre Artur Mas.
El gobierno de Rajoy alega que el referéndum es inconstitucional, mientras que el de Mas advirtió que el el proceso soberanista aún no terminaba con la resolución del tribunal.

Secciones: Noticias

OIL PRICES DECLINE: PLOT OF SAUDI ARABIA AND USA AGAINST RUSSIA?

As the price of oil drops, so do hopes for Russia's economic future

OCTOBER 13, PAVEL KOSHKIN (RUSSIA DIRECT)

Russian and foreign experts give their opinions about whether or not a recent drop in oil prices will be precarious for Russia’s weakening economy.

After Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s biggest oil exporters responsible for determining the price of oil worldwide, announced that it would give a big discount to its Asian customers, there was an immediate decline in oil prices. Of course, basic supply and demand - lower oil consumption and higher oil production (and, particularly, Riyadh’s reluctance to decrease oil production) - played a role as well. Yet, with the upcoming OPEC Summit scheduled for late November, experts are concerned with the current policy unpredictability surrounding energy prices.
Until recently some Russian officials, and, particularly, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, have assured markets that Saudi Arabia is not interested in rapidly declining oil prices, which are hardly likely to drop below $80-85 per barrel, even in a worst-case scenario. Likewise, Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, has been even more bullish, claiming that oil prices cannot plummet below $90 per barrel. On top of that, he believes that within the next five to seven years, oil prices might reach $150.
Yet the recent downward trend in oil prices – Brent crude prices have dropped 20 percent since mid-July, from $115 per barrel to about $90 – seems to have brought about more unpredictability.
Siluanov predicted that Russia’s budget would lack 500 billon rubles (nearly $12.5 billion) if oil prices drop to $87 per barrel and the dollar-ruble exchange rate trades as high as 40 in 2015. In such a scenario, Russia would have to use money from its Reserve Fund, which comprises about $90 billionhe announced at the Oct. 13 session of the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament.
All of these recent developments have spurred the growth of numerous conspiracy theoriesamong the Russian elites and led to a certain amount of consternation. They have also made Russian policymakers reassess their economic policy.
Surprisingly, Russia’s former Financial Minister Alexei Kudrin told Russian TV that he didn’t rule out that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had teamed up against Russia to dump oil on the world markets. They could agree on an increase of oil production and, thus, its supply in the energy market, in order to lead to plummeting prices of black gold,” he said, as quoted by a number of Russian media. According to him, this trend might be maintained at a low level only during one year.
In contrast to Kudrin and those who agree with him, some Western experts are genuinely perplexed at the growth of conspiracy theories about oil prices and Saudi Arabia’s policy.  
“Actually, oil prices have been at an extraordinary high level in the last four years and it is not surprising that they should drop to a level closer to the historical norm,” Edward Chow, senior fellow of the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told Russia Direct. “Since 2011, we have experienced the highest annual prices in the entire history of the petroleum industry in both nominal and inflation-adjusted terms.”
Chow argues that even if oil prices fall to $80 per barrel, it would be a high price by historical standards and only mark a return to the level of 2010, before the big increase in price.
Meanwhile, some Russian experts argue that that the headlong drop in oil prices amidst the increasing geopolitical risks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East brings about suspicions in the Kremlin for a reason.  
“The idea that somebody is dumping oil prices cannot help coming to one’s mind,” said Professor Yakov Mirkin, Head of the Department of International Capital Markets at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations. “Whether it is true or not, we will never know.”
However, today commodity derivatives in New York, Chicago or London determine prices on energy resources. So, it is much more difficult to point fingers at the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and blame them for participating in a manipulation plot, Mirkin clarifies, implying that is impossible to prove such a conspiracy despite numerous investigations into previous cases of alleged manipulations of oil prices during the Cold War.        
During the 1980s, oil prices had been steadily growing since the 1970s and reached their apex when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which led to deterioration in Moscow’s relations with the West.  
As prominent Russian economist Yegor Gaidar, the architect of the post-Soviet economic liberalization program, pointed out in his book “Collapse of an Empire,” Saudi Arabia saw the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan as a potential threat, which drove Riyadh to reassess its relations with the U.S. and, finally, bring them together. With the U.S. seeking low oil prices, Saudi Arabia tripled its oil production in 1985-1986, thereby inducing prices to plummet from $30 to $12 per barrel.
Chow argues that it is reckless to compare the 1980s drop in oil prices with the current situation.
“In 1985-1986 Saudi Arabia was at an extremely low production level and faced the prospect of having to cut production even more to prop up prices at the $30 level,” he said. “Today it is producing at a much higher level than in 1985-1986 and is signaling that it is unwilling to give up market share to sustain historically high prices, which are not in Saudi Arabia’s long term interests.”
Chow expects that this time the price drop to be “shallower” than the precipitous drop in the mid-1980s and, probably, shorter-lived.
Likewise, Mirkin is hesitant to compare the drop in 2014 oil prices with 1986 because it is too early to draw such parallels. 
“So far, there is no clarity that such a drop will be long-term or not,” he said. All this has been happening only during three monthsIn the 1980s it had been perennial for years. ”
According to him, today’s Russia is more flexible economically and has much more room for maneuvering unlike the 1980s Soviet Union, because, currently, it can be seen as a market economy conditioned to function in global markets.     
“Roughly speaking, modern Russia – I hope – is a stronger and craftier creature that the Soviet Union’s machine was,” he sums up.
When asked how long Russia’s economy is able to keep afloat during a period of an oil price decline, Mirkin said that Russia is hardly likely to sustain financial instability for at least one year, regardless of probable recession and stagnation.
“This year Russia has seen a positive trade balance, which is 10 percent bigger than last year,” he said. “The currency reserves are likewise big, with a quarter of them (more than $100 billion) invested in U.S. state bonds.”
However, in the mid-term (two-four years), the oil price drop increases the risks of a crisis in Russia, which might have global implications and hamper chances of economic growth in Europe, Mirkin warns.
“Nevertheless, the economy has stared adjusting to rainy days and Russia’s final economic vector is unknown,” he clarified. “All this [sanctions, economic stagnation, weak ruble] may be expensive and unpleasant, but when money is decreasing, this helps the economy to be more effective sometimes.”
Meanwhile, Chow said that addiction to oil and gas has crowded out the growth potential in other sectors of economy. So, he looks at the challenge from the point of view of a half-full, half-empty perspective.
“Relatively lower prices offer Russia the opportunity to diversify its economy with more balanced policies,” he said.
According to Mirkin, a lot in Russia’s economic policy will depend on the duration of the downward trend in oil prices, whether it will go beyond one year.
“If we see a reverse [of the current trend], we will soon forget about fears and speculations,” Mirkin said.
As he points out, the importers of energy resources will obviously benefit from a long-term drop in oil prices, and particularly, Eastern Europe and Ukraine, which are desperately negotiating with Russia over oil prices. Likewise, among the winners may be China, Germany and even the U.S., which is still seen as a net energy importer. Yet, geopolitically, both Moscow and Washington might benefit, according to Mirkin.
“Such a drop in oil prices decreases finance and resources for radical Islamic movements in Russia,” he argues.
However, in the mid-term perspective, the benefits from the oil prices drop are not so obvious because it may bring about instability in exporters of energy resources, including in Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries, which might spur economic maelstroms in the world economy, Mirkin warns. 
“The map of global finances based on high oil prices might be redrawn,” he predicts. “Likewise, the risks of the shale revolution could be increased. These alternative energy projects may be suspended. Investment in the energy sector might plummet as well.”

IAN BREMMER: THE COMPLEXITIES OF THIS WORLD

- IAN BREMMER: EVERY STATE FOR ITSELF


THIS IS SYRIA NOW

AN OPINION FROM LITHUANIA ON UKRAINE`S CRISIS

Opinion: a victory for Putin in Ukraine and against the West


DELFI, BY THE LITHUANIA TRIBUNE

Separatists near Donetsk


The Russian president has scored a victory in Ukraine and against the West. Vladimir Putin has got more than he hoped for, and yet there’s still a lot more that he can win. The game has now become long-term and one in which the most important thing will be strategic patience. And it’s not clear if Russia has the upper here.
The victories of Russia’s armed forces in Ukraine at the end of September crowned Moscow’s mid-year glories. Impeded Ukrainian troops will in all likelihood lose another strategic facility, not daring to brazenly violate the cease fire as units of the Russian separatists have. The conflict though has already frozen, just as planned by the Kremlin eight years ago.
The fact is that one year ago the unimaginable worst scenario is now the grim truth. 
Having lost thousands of its citizens, Ukraine is dividing its own territory into a buffer zone. Its government is pleased now that it has “stabilised” the front line defends the ceasefire which is essentially better than war. This nevertheless only compounds Kiev’s powerlessness in the face of Moscow’s actions.
The Crimea is lost and nobody no longer holds out any hope of regaining it.
Kiev itself is asking for a halt to the Association Agreement with the European Union only this time it’s not in exchange for a fifteen billion-dollar loan, as was the case with the president who fled, but for Russia’s fragile promise that it will not take punitive measures.
Initially, the price of gas was increased two-fold, the cynical justification of which was that Ukraine can no longer give a discount, when Ukraine can no longer supply Russian ships at the port of Sevastopol. Thereafter the gas supply was cut off completely. With the approach of winter the European Union imposes an agreement acceptable to Kiev, one according to which Ukraine is to pay not twice but one and a half times more than it can. A stab in the back came from Hungary which succumbed to Russia’s blackmail not to resell at a cheaper rate “Gazprom”-supplied gas.
The economy is on downturn and it’s clear now that agreed upon loans from the International Monetary Fund loans are woefully insufficient, and that’s if Kiev can show that it is worthy of them.
The society has been numbed by war and has become even more fragmented and disillusioned. Some of it has become radicalized. Almost one year since the Maidan has been lost; corruption is thriving more than ever (with the war it’s become even cynical); reforms have hardly been initiated. Many of the leaders are incompetent. The media, instead of becoming stronger, more often than not spreads Ukrainian propaganda which seen as an appropriate answer to Moscow’s propaganda.
The president and prime minister cannot agree if they really want to be a part of NATO. Lithuania, which consistently defended Ukraine in the European Union has only just now found out from the press that its work of many years has been thrown out by the president who has asked that the Association Agreement be postponed. “We cannot be bigger Ukrainian patriots than the Ukrainians themselves” is the conviction now expressed by Kiev’s former champions.
The international picture is even gloomier.
All fundamental international agreements endorsed by Europe have been ripped up with nobody in the West being able to secure them.
Russia has shown that it can it can effectively mobilise all its needed resources – from thugs for whom medieval torture is routine to propaganda that barefacedly paints another truth which incites the population. From oligarchs, scared that the usual silence of loyalty to business no longer suffices and who intrude with approval into the public space, to the central bank that finances well the government’s folly.
The Russian army is rapidly catching up with NATO and the “hybrid war” is several steps ahead of the West’s ability to respond.
The European Union which already a few months ago explained that there will not be a new Molotov and Ribbentrop pact is now not only discussing with Russia its disgruntlement with the Association Agreement, it’s actually giving the option of changing it, already ratified, to suit Moscow’s liking. In the meantime a coalition of Russia’s business partners are now urging that the sanctions that took six months to introduce, be lessened despite the fact that the situation is actually getting worse.
NATO admitted that it was powerless to defend its allies timeously and in the way it should have and that it dithered lest it provoke Russia into going all the way. Confronted with war the Alliance’s main weapon has been deterrence and which has undermined to the extent that Moscow can be tempted to ruin NATO by showing that the allies are “not prepared to die for the Narva”.
Commitments for a duly financed defense were identified in Wales for the first time but just as vague goals.
In parallel, in the universe of the Kremlin’s leaders, America is to blame for all of Russia’s woes and which in reality just trying as much as possible to withdraw from the greatest security challenge in Europe. The president is taking the correct steps and says the right things but shows no leadership neither with Ukraine nor with any foreign policy issue.
The West is generously supplying weapons to groups in Iraq and Syria but openly supplies weapons to Ukraine after it participated in all NATO operations. A Taboo. 
So many changes in one year as slow as they are far too many. They will however slow down from now on and the equilibrium will revert to a long-term game.
Although often accused of pragmatism, Russia for the time being is actually taking preventative action. It started a war to block Kiev’s road to choose drawing closer to the West. And now Moscow is openly declaring, even from a United Nations rostrum, that Ukraine must remain a neutral country, a “buffer zone”, and if it agrees with this the war will stop. It has most of the required leverage to effectively blackmail Kiev.
For all the practical steps taken by Petro Poroshenko, it doesn’t look as he is questioning this state of affairs imposed by Moscow. Barring any sudden upheavals, everybody will just have to live with it at least for the time being. Bearing in mind that Ukraine will not suddenly find the determination to start internal reforms, it will take a long time for it to become robust.
On the other hand, Russia too will need a lot of time if it conceives of moving further west and redrawing NATO’s and the European Union’s boundaries, for example in the Baltic States. That would be a truly pragmatic step and not just an available opportunity in Ukraine to use to achieve its aims. This would cost Russia dearly, at least in the near future.
Russia’s isolation is now starting to be felt. This could increase the people’s passion to a level of Germany’s in the 1930s. Still, judging from steps taken by the Kremlin to moderate propaganda ardor, it is more probable that once it reached its most important and closest foreign policy goal, Moscow will for at least a certain time settle down.
It’s plain to see that Mr. Putin has the strategic patience to play a long-term game. The most important question here though is does the West? On one hand the West could break up and in its weakness turn attention to other problems. On the other, no matter how hopelessly sluggish the awareness of Europe’s major capital cities may be, even the major champions for a return to good relations with Russia cannot ignore the fundamental changes it has triggered in Europe.
The tectonic plates have shifted and as they clash there will no doubt be friction. Occurrences like seizing ships, abductions by security agents and violations of air space will increase. A perfidious Russia is and will be the main threat to NATO. However, if Russia shows muscle only but goes no further, the long-term tension that holds sway will no longer be too bad for Lithuania – that is if it can just manage to stick to maintaining a forceful but wise line in the European Union and NATO. At the same time Lithuania must be able to strengthen its internal institutions, first and foremost defense, so that it does not present Russia with a similar opportunity like Ukraine, and improve integration with the West (Lithuania will at least no longer have to prove it was paranoiac towards Russia and will certainly be possible to demand solidarity).
A long-term game opens up a lot of opportunities for big politics and lessens the need to react quickly to Russia’s actions, something the West has not managed to do. Securing a vigorous and united policy on fundamental issues and ensuring effective deterrence will be the most important challenges. There are however already questions as to how the West is to resolve things within its own community. In the long term, the West’s resilient societies with centuries of developed values and its strength of economy should be sufficient support for Lithuania.
The West has not managed to help Ukraine and in all likelihood attempts will have to be put off before starting again. They now have to prepare themselves in earnest for a long winter.