LA BAJA DEL CRUDO JAQUEA A NUEVOS INVERSORES EN USA

MERCADO DEL PETRÓLEO »

El desplome del petróleo amenaza a los nuevos productores de EE UU

Los precios a ambos lados del Atlántico han caído casi un 20% en un mes

• El petróleo baja de los 80 dólares por primera vez en cuatro años

SANDRO POZZI, DIARIO EL PAIS, MADRID, DECEMBER 2, 2014.

El desplome del precio del petróleo empieza a recordar en Wall Street al preludio del estallido de la burbuja tecnológica, hace 15 años. Esta vez las víctimas de su propio éxito pueden ser los jóvenes productores que emergieron durante los últimos años con el renacer energético de Estados Unidos, gracias a las nuevas técnicas de extracción. Un precio inferior a los 70 dólares (56 euros) el barril amenaza la supervivencia de los pequeños y favorece a los más grandes.

El petróleo de referencia en EE UU, el barril Texas, arrancó diciembre tratando de mantener los 65 dólares, tras perder más de un 10% de su valor en los dos días previos a la reunión de la Organización de Países Productores y Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP). En todo noviembre, los precios del barril Texas y el Brent, la referencia europea, cayeron casi un 20% del precio. Ayer en cambio, recuperó terreno. El Brent subió un 2,7%, hasta los 72 dólares.

La decisión del cártel de mantener la producción intacta hizo temblar a los productores en los yacimientos de Dakota del Norte. El petróleo es muy fácil de extraer del suelo en Arabia Saudí, hasta el punto de que pueden soportar un precio del barril a 10 dólares para ser rentables. En Alaska, las petroleras pueden tolerar precios a 40 dólares. En Canadá, hasta 50 dólares.Este es una buena noticia para el consumidor justo al inicio de la temporada de compras navideñas. Sin embargo, la volatilidad reciente en el mercado de la energía plantea serios problemas a los cientos de productores de fracking y shale en EE UU. Los yacimientos de referencia para los analistas son Eagle Ford y Permian, al sur de Texas, y Bakken, en las montañas de Dakota del Norte. El primero, como indican desde Scotiabank, sigue siendo rentable a los precios actuales. Los otros dos, en cambio, están ya en color rojo.

Sin embargo, la situación se complica cuando se baja al sur de EE UU. El nivel de rentabilidad medio en Bakken y Permian ronda los 40 y los 70 dólares dependiendo del productor y de la zona de extracción, mientras que en Eagle Ford pueden tolerar que baje a los 60 dólares. Lo que está por ver es cuánto tiempo tiene que pasar a estos niveles para que se produzca una reducción en la actividad de extracción de crudo en estas áreas clave.

Uno de los detalles en los que se fijan los analistas, por eso, es el nivel de deuda que acumularon estas compañías para poder dar vida a los proyectos de extracción. Deustche Bank da casi por hecho que el precio del barril de West Texas puede bajar aún a los 60 dólares. Bank of America ve posible incluso que se acerque a los 50 dólares. Pero en ambos casos, más allá de un precio concreto, coinciden en que habrá volatilidad durante cuatro o cinco años.Bank of America anticipa seis meses de volatilidad como mínimo en el mercado del petróleo, porque hay un exceso de capacidad evidente. Es algo que señaló también la Agencia Internacional de la Energía en su último informe anual. Solo en los yacimientos de Eagle Ford hay cerca de 200 operadores, muchos de ellos independientes de las grandes petroleras y que pueden sufrir de liquidez si la situación se prolonga.

Visto de otra manera, la carencia de estabilidad en el precio puede ser un problema mayor para los pequeños productores de petróleo porque eso no da certidumbre a sus inversiones. Por eso, desde Bank of America, anticipan que el desplome en el precio del petróleo provocará un cambio a la hora de operar este sector y puede provocar que se inicie una ola de consolidación en el sector.

EE UU está cambiando por completo el juego de fuerza global en el tablero de la energía. El recorte en las importaciones de crudo durante los últimos años equivale a la producción combinada de Arabia Saudí y Nigeria, según Citigroup. El ritmo al que avanza la producción de hidrocarburos en el país hará que su balanza comercial energética no tenga ya déficit en 2018.La OPEP dejó claro el jueves que no quiere hacer sola el trabajo de dar estabilidad al precio del petróleo, especialmente Irán y Arabia Saudí. La cuestión es hasta qué punto EE UU y Canadá están dispuestas en esta situación a ayudar a equilibrar el mercado o a rebajar la tensión dando cifras claras sobre la producción real derivada de las nuevas técnicas de extracción. Los analistas de Citigroup, sin embargo, no creen que la situación vaya a cambiar.

La reflexión de los analistas es que la OPEP tiene cada vez menos sentido limitada a 11 miembro, y controlada por los saudíes. Una opción para mantener su relevancia pasaría por integrar a Rusia, que también sufre esta situación. La esperanza en Wall Street, señalan desde Nomura, es que el modelo de los productores de shale se muestre más resistente ante la última jugada del cártel.

THE HEGEMONY OF THE AKP'S ERDOGAN IN TURKEY

On AK Party’s successes and failures by Bican Şahin*

http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_on-ak-partys-successes-and-failures-by-bican-sahin-_345587.html

The Justice and Development Party (AK Party), having received 45 percent of the vote, was ranked first in the March 30 mayoral elections. Based on these results, we must say that it won a landslide victory. However, despite this relative success, we cannot possibly argue that it won an absolute victory.

I think the election performance of the AK Party on March 30 indicates both success and failure. Compared to its rivals, including the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), we can of course argue that the AK Party was successful, given that its votes are equal to the votes of the other two combined. However, given its 50 percent share of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections and the opinion polls before the Gezi Park protests suggesting that its share was well above 50 percent, it can be said that the AK Party was not successful in the recent local elections. From this perspective, we can conclude that the AK Party lost some of its support due to the Gezi protests and the developments surrounding the Dec. 17, 2013 corruption operation.

However, we should also note that there is success within this failure of the AK Party as well. Despite serious corruption charges directed at leading members of the party, including the prime minister, the AK Party preserved 90 percent of its votes, if we take the 50 percent they received in the last elections as a reference point.

What factors played a role in this relative success of the AK Party? The primary factors and reasons include the economy, ideological affiliations, domestic and foreign security, leadership, the election campaign as well as democratic concerns. Any analysis by which we might determine which of these has been most influential on the election results will remain a hypothesis unless it is supported by empirical study. And, of course, it is only natural that some hypotheses seem more logical than others.

The hypothesis focusing on economic factors asserts that owing to its successful performance in the field of the economy over the last 12 years, the AK Party attracted greater support from the people compared with other parties and that it preserved its voter support because no economic crisis occurred before the most recent local elections.

Looking at AK Party's ideology

The hypothesis focusing on the ideological orientation of the supporters asserts that the AK Party has a solid and strong ideology and that subscribers to this ideology remained loyal to their party in the March 30 mayoral elections.

The hypothesis about domestic and external security says the AK Party's election success can be best explained by confidence in a strong party such as the AK Party at a time when national security was at stake. Another hypothesis focuses on leadership and the election campaign. This hypothesis asserts that the primary reason for the AK Party's ability to preserve its popular support is Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's charisma and election campaign.

Finally, we can also talk about a democratic awareness hypothesis, which argues that people voted for the AK Party in the March 30 mayoral elections because they considered the Dec. 17 operation to be a coup attempt against the government and therefore they wanted to express their support for civilian authority and rule.

Let me start by assessing the final hypothesis first. I believe that only a small number of people who would not have voted for the ruling party anyway voted for the AK Party in the aftermath of the Dec. 17 process in an attempt to show their support for democracy. And I do not agree with the argument that someone who voted for the AK Party before and is happy with its current performance would vote for it again out of a desire to protect democracy. This might reinforce the tendency of a person who already votes for the AK Party. To this end, I believe that generalizations based on the 45 percent the party received that say the people expressed support for democracy and taught the coup-makers a lesson are not realistic. Such generalizations are a case of intellectuals imposing their own thinking and assumptions on the masses.

Although we can assume that 45 percent of the voters expressed support for the AK Party to preserve democracy, we cannot argue against the assertion that 55 percent of voters were motivated by their opposition to authoritarian tendencies, corruption and a decline in the supremacy of law. However, we all know that at least part of the 45 percent of people who voted for the AK Party have remained silent about antidemocratic moves and that a substantial part of the 55 percent of the people who did not vote for the AK Party also remained indifferent to some antidemocratic developments, including the case to dissolve the AK Party and some decisions of the Constitutional Court.

I think the hypothesis suggesting that the AK Party's success is attributable to strong leadership abilities and an effective election campaign is at least partially true. To this end, it could be argued that Erdoğan's charismatic leadership and an election campaign based on a distinction between friends and enemies, as suggested by Carl Schmitt, contributed to the AK Party's election success. In the election rallies, Erdoğan delivered a strong message that an operation had been plotted by his enemies (the Hizmet movement) against himself and his friends. This might have led some supporters who previously voted for the AK Party but questioned this support after the corruption operation to reconsider their decision and express full support for the leader and fellow party members. But I do not think this is the main determinant in the AK Party's election success. Before the consolidation of a support base through charisma and this friend/enemy discourse, support must have already been created.

The hypothesis suggesting that voters preferred the AK Party because of security reasons may be partially accurate. The perception is that the domestic security threat has diminished after the settlement process initiated by the government; this was considered a major success of the ruling party. On the other hand, the Syrian crisis still remains a source of external threat for Turkey. An armed confrontation with Syria has become even more likely because of developments around the Tomb of Suleyman Shah in Syria, the downing of a Syrian aircraft and the likelihood of a response from the Turkish military before the elections. These developments might have contributed to voters' desire for a stronger government. To this end, it can be argued that AK Party voters supported the government because of their perception of an external security threat.

The first question that needs to be asked about the hypothesis concerning subscription to a political ideology is whether the AK Party has a coherent ideology. We know that the AK Party did not have a concrete ideology when it was founded, and that it searched for a coherent political ideology after coming to power. Out of this search, the party agreed on a conservative-democratic identity. It is not wrong to argue that this position indicates a liberal stance in political matters, a social stance in economic issues and a conservative standpoint on cultural affairs. We can also argue that this position remained steady in the period from 2002 to 2010. However, it is also apparent that the liberal tone in the AK Party's ideology started to disappear in the aftermath of the 2011 parliamentary elections, being replaced by a nationalistic-conservative discourse.

A populist conservative identity and approach

As of today, it is possible to argue that the AK Party's political-ideological position indicates a populist conservative identity and approach. To this end, we can further argue that the AK Party is a political party that has changed significantly in relation to the conditions while preserving its conservative character, rather than a party with a strong and coherent political ideology. On the other hand, the majority of AK Party supporters are moderately nationalist-conservative right-wing voters. Before the 2002 elections, these people had voted for either the True Path Party (DYP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) or the Welfare Party (RP). However, almost all of these voters are now represented by the AK Party. It is possible to argue that these voters are acting ideologically as long as they refrain from voting for a left-wing party. However, this also suggests that voting for a single party rather than three different ones with right-wing orientations is a pragmatic approach and that they view the party's general orientation as the main factor. This further reveals that these voters will choose alternatives within the right-wing orientation in the case of a serious failure.

I strongly believe that the most plausible hypothesis to explain the AK Party's relative success in the March 30 elections is the one focusing on the economy. This suggests that the AK Party has performed well in the economic field since coming to power in 2002. The macroeconomic indicators of the Turkish economy have improved since the 2001 crisis.

In this respect, the rate of inflation declined and the economy grew fast. Of course, the government holds the lion's share in this success. The ruling party took advantage of this success; as a result of this, it increased its share of the vote from 34 percent in 2002 to 41 percent in 2004 and 46.6 percent in 2007. The only exception to this stable increase was after the negative growth performance in Turkey in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008; the AK Party received 38.4 percent of the vote in the local elections held after the crisis.

However, the economy improved after 2009, and the AK Party received 49.8 percent of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections. And its share of the vote was 45 percent in the March 30 mayoral elections. The most important question that needs to be asked at this point is why the AK Party experienced a 5 percent decline in its share of the vote despite there being no economic instability during this process and no significant change in the national economic performance. I think the answer to this question should be sought within the authoritarian tendencies of the AK Party since the 2011 elections and the most recent corruption scandal. But I am not going to discuss that in detail here.

The hypothesis about political ideology explains why voters did not prefer left-wing parties, but it fails to offer an explanation as to why they did not prefer parties such as the Democrat Party (DP), which holds a similar ideology to the AK Party. I believe the answer is economic performance. Of course, it is not reasonable to argue that the other factors have had no influence on the AK Party's success. But I do suggest that the hypotheses focusing on other factors are only explanatory if they are considered along with the economic hypothesis.

*Dr. Bican Şahin is an associate professor at Hacettepe University. 

EUobserver / Moldova's pro-EU parties in narrow election lead

EUobserver / Moldova's pro-EU parties in narrow election lead

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGINS AND STYLE OF THE ANC IN SOUTH AFRICA

Anthea Jeffery’s People’s War Launched in Johannesburg

http://jonathanball.bookslive.co.za/blog/2009/09/07/anthea-jefferys-peoples-war-launched-in-johannesburg/

Anthea Jeffery’s People’s War: New light on the struggle for South Africa is described thus on the Jonathan Ball website:

“Fifteen years have passed since South Africans were being shot or hacked or burned to death in political conflict; and the memory of the trauma has faded. Some 20 500 people were nevertheless killed between 1984 and 1994. The conventional wisdom is that they died at the hands of a state-backed Third Force, but the more accurate explanation is that they died as a result of the people’s war the ANC unleashed.”

This third book from Anthea Jeffery may prove explosive; guests were left stunned at the Exclusive Books Hyde Park launch on Thursday, 3 September. People’s War challenges the very basis of our understanding of contemporary South Africa.

Introduced by EB’s Maryanne Hancock, John Kane-Berman, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations (which co-hosted the event), spoke about the lawlessness that was originally fomented to make South Africa ungovernable in the death throws of Apartheid; he described it as a “genie that cannot easily be put back in the bottle.” He explained how besides policies and procedure, a wider violent strategy was adopted by the ANC, MK and other allies during this period.

Seeing a change in the temperament of political demonstrations and who was at them in the late 80s and early 90s, analysts starting looking at whether there was a new organized strategy at work – as opposed to spontaneous political protest. Kane-Berman spoke of how broadcasts of Radio Freedom seemed to correlate with, and pre-empt episodes of violence on the ground in South Africa.

In addition, he said, much of what was happening in the townships and throughout SA’s cities wasn’t being written about. Black journalists were not particularly keen to write about the violence they were witnessing, for fear of repercussions. The SAIRR’s 1991 book Mau-mauing the Media documented this “unofficial [self] censorship”.

Kane-Berman articulated how in 1990, within 3 months of the unbanning of the ANC, researchers realized that this period was going to be the most violent in South Africa since the end of World War II. The conventional explanation accepted by South Africans for so long has been the idea of a Third Force in part created by FW de Klerk. But Kane-Berman queried why a man who released political prisoners would orchestrate such violence: “Why would FW take such huge political risks and then shoot himself in the foot?”

Kane-Berman left us to ponder the seemingly imponderable: that South Africa’s 1994 election was not “a miracle” but a planned result of a far-reaching violent political strategy. People’s War is a book about understanding this and getting to grips with a new perspective of the end of Apartheid.

Kane-Berman praised Jeffery’s work, citing her prodigious energy, meticulous research skills, writing ability and most of all her courage in connecting the dots and writing about the “people’s war”. He said he hoped this book would make a difference.

Anthea Jeffrey then took the mic and fleshed out the background to the book with care and detail. She said the “people’s war” started in 1985 with the first wave of school boycotts in the Eastern Cape, with intimidation and violence perpetrated against those who stayed away. The gruesome practice of necklacing started in Uitenhage, she said, with the necklacing of KwaNobuhle community councillor Benjamin Kinkini. Jeffery stated that Kinikini shot his own son to save him the agony of being necklaced. Later that year 8 other people were necklaced in Port Elizabeth.

There seemed to be a concerted outbreak of violence against community members and leaders who wouldn’t toe the ANC line, including security police members and their families. Jeffery said that the idea was to collapse local government.

She explained how this new type of revolutionary war, the “people’s war”, was both political and military, creating “a hammer and anvil between which there was no differentiation of combatants versus civilians”. Everyone was expendable in the same way as arms and ammunition – including children.

In addition to the “people’s war” there was “a persistent propaganda campaign with a constant repetition of themes”. Untruths spread from seemingly diverse quarters became accepted as truths. The National Party government, IFP and the “Third Force” were blamed for all the violence. Society was in ferment with ANC street committees giving way to combat units aimed at bringing everyone under control through terror. The violence became an ongoing, unstoppable circle with police resorting to “draconian methods” in response to it.

In 1993 Mangosuthu Buthelezi drew attention to the 275 IFP leaders who had been killed since 1985 – he asked why this was of no consequence. He asked how the 1994 election could be free and fair in such a climate and withdrew from the election process in protest. He was demonized for his views and actions at the time.

Jeffery’s book lays out how the “people’s war” allowed the ANC to dominate the negotiating process, marginalizing people like Buthelezi, and seize a virtual monopoly on power in 1994.

In her opinion, the election of 1994 was “deeply flawed”, and in the last 15 years the bright new start that was promised then has been betrayed. The violence and culture of terror from pre-1994 plays a role in the “plague of violent crime” which SA faces today. She finds that the “people’s war” is a major factor in the increasingly violent strikes, such as the recent SANDF strike, which the country is grappling with.

Jeffrey hopes that People’s War will “strip away the veil across SA’s recent history and allow us all to see it more clearly”. In the book she acknowledges and honours the “little people” who were caught up in this war and hopes it will enable families, friends and all South Africans to understand why they died.

LAS FARC LIBERARON AL GENERAL ALZATE

NEGOCIACIÓN CON LAS FARC »

Las FARC liberan en Colombia al general secuestrado

Parte del equipo negociador del Gobierno viajará este lunes a La Habana para evaluar lo ocurrido con el militar y sus repercusiones en los diálogos de paz

• Los autores del plagio

ELIZABETH REYES L. Bogotá DIARIO EL PAIS, MADRID30 NOV 2014 

La guerrilla de las FARC cumplió con su palabra y ha liberado a las nueve de la mañana (seis horas menos que la España peninsular) de este domingo al general Rubén Darío Alzate, un cabo y una abogada, secuestrados hace dos semanas. El presidente Juan Manuel Santos fue el primero en dar la noticia en su cuenta de Twitter: “Liberados BG Alzate, abogada Urrego y cabo Rodríguez en perfectas condiciones y esperando condiciones climáticas para regreso a sus familias”, escribió.

Los liberados fueron entregados por el líder guerrillero Pastor Alape, uno de los negociadores de la guerrilla en La Habana, quién viajó al Chocó para completar el operativo encabezado por el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja (CICR) y representantes de los Gobiernos de Cuba y Noruega. La liberación se produjo a orillas del río Arquía, en el departamento de Chocó, al noroeste del país; la misma zona selvática donde fue secuestrado el alto militar el 16 de noviembre. Luego fueron trasladados a una dependencia militar en Antioquia y finalmente al hospital militar de Bogotá, donde se reencontraron con sus familias. La CICR realizó una primera revisión médica y confirmó que están en buenas condiciones de salud.

El Chocó es una selva tropical, llena de ríos en la que llueve constantemente. Es limítrofe con Panamá y allí tienen presencia algunos frentes de las FARC, el ELN (la otra guerrilla colombiana) y bandas criminales. En el momento del secuestro, Alzate se encontraba vestido de civil y sin ningún tipo de seguridad, lo que se ha interpretado como una imprudencia del oficial, que se convirtió en el militar de más alto rango en poder la guerrilla en toda la historia del conflicto colombiano.

Ya libres, se espera que se reanuden los diálogos de paz,suspendidos por el presidente Juan Manuel Santos el 16 de noviembre,el mismo día en que el alto militar fue secuestrado en el Chocó. Este hecho ha desatado la mayor crisis que han tenido las negociaciones de paz en dos años, ya que Santos puso como condición que los liberaran para continuar negociando el fin del conflicto armado. La guerrilla, por su parte, ha criticado que el mandatario rompiera el acuerdo que tenían bajo la premisa pactada de antemano de que lo ocurriera en el campo de batalla no tendría porqué afectar las negociaciones.Las FARC se han pronunciado desde La Habana, agradeciendo la mediación de Cuba y Noruega, países garantes del proceso de paz, para superar el impasse, "porque su participación en las liberaciones, de alguna manera salva un proceso de paz que avanzaba en medio de la esperanza", dijo Iván Márquez, número dos de esa guerrilla y jefe negociador. Por su parte, el presidente Santos, en un comunicado, valoró la pronta liberación. "Aunque el paso dado por las FARC corresponde al deber de obrar conforme a la ley, es evidente que esa decisión contribuye a recuperar el clima propicio para continuar los diálogos, demuestra la madurez del proceso".

En medio de este episodio que hoy termina con éxito, lo que seguramente le dará oxígeno a los diálogos de paz, las FARC han aprovechado para insistir en un cese bilateral al fuego, que Santos descarta de tajo. "Tengo la convicción de que negociar en medio del conflicto ha sido la mejor manera de preservar los elementos esenciales del Estado y evitar que las conversaciones se conviertan en un ejercicio interminable", dijo el presidente en el comunicado divulgado al medio día.

La guerrilla también ha puesto la lupa sobre los guerrilleros que están presos y enfermos, lo que podría convertirse en uno de los temas en los que se centren, una vez se retomen las negociaciones de paz. “Deseamos que esta libertad, fundada en razones de humanidad, extienda sus efectos benéficos a los prisioneros políticos y sociales del país. Qué fácil y qué humanitario es para el gobierno determinar un indulto para inocentes”, dice un comunicado de este sábado.

Lo que ocurra al interior de la mesa de negociaciones de paz, es ahora la gran pregunta. El jefe negociador del Gobierno, Humberto de la Calle, anunció tras una reunión con Santos el domingo en la noche, que una parte de su equipo viajará este lunes a La Habana para tener una reunión de dos días con las FARC, donde se evaluará lo ocurrido en las últimas dos semanas. Esa evaluación, explicó De la Calle, es con el ánimo de lograr "mayor eficacia en los diálogos, con el ánimo de decidir hechos de paz, con el ánimo de buscar decisiones prontas sobre lo que hemos llamado el desescalamiento del conflicto", que no es otra cosa que bajarle la intensidad.

El jefe máximo de las FARC, conocido como Timochenko ya le había dicho a Santos en una dura carta que se conoció la semana pasada, que “las cosas no podrán reanudarse así nada más”. Esta posición la han confirmado sus hombres en Cuba. "Ahora tendremos que rediseñar las reglas del juego", dijeron este domingo.

Los autores del plagio

El general Alzate y sus dos acompañantes fueron retenidos por hombres del bloque ‘Iván Ríos’ de las FARC que hace presencia en tres departamentos de Colombia. En el Chocó, al noroeste del país, donde ocurrió el plagio del alto militar, opera el frente 34, una de las estructuras que conforman el bloque, al mando de Isaías Trujillo, un veterano de 70 años que hace poco se integró al equipo que negocia la paz en Cuba. Este hombre, que hace parte del Estado Mayor de las FARC y es considerado unos de sus ‘históricos’, tiene a cuestas una larga lista de órdenes de captura por secuestros, desapariciones y homicidios.

La fundación Insight Crime, que estudia el crimen organizado en América Latina, afirma que el bloque ‘Iván Ríos’, que tendría alrededor de 150 hombres, es el más débil de las FARC en términos de “mando y control”, por lo que corre el riesgo “de fragmentarse y criminalizarse” tras una eventual desmovilización. Según sus analistas, subsiste de vender pasta de coca a las bandas criminales, la extorsión y la minería de oro ilegal. Esta última la realizan cobrando un “impuesto” a la maquinaria que extrae el mineral de los ríos. Otro de sus frentes, el 57, opera a lo largo de la frontera con Panamá.

Para Ariel Ávila, de la Fundación Paz y Reconciliación, el ‘Iván Ríos’ es uno de los bloques “más complejos” de las FARC para analizar. “A su manera son sui generis porque fueron de los primeros en hacer un pacto de no agresión con el Clan Úsuga y meterse en el tema de minería ilegal”, dijo a este diario. El Clan Úsuga, también conocido como Los Urabeños, es la banda criminal más grande que hay en Colombia (2.300 hombres) y está al mando del paramilitar Darío Antonio Úsuga, quien es primo de Isaías Trujillo, precisamente el jefe del bloque que se reivindicó el plagio del general. Para las autoridades colombianas, además de los vínculos familiares, entre los grupos que comandan hay una “alianza delincuencial”.

Por estas actividades, la capacidad de comando y control de las FARC se puso a prueba una vez el ‘Iván Ríos’ reconoció que tenía en su poder al general Alzate, pero este bloque despejó las dudas cuando aseguró que se subordinaban a lo que decidieran sus superiores, algo que quedó demostrado el domingo. “La rápida reacción sobre la liberación demuestra que no es tan cierto que sus unidades actúen sueltas, ni siquiera un bloque como el ‘Iván Ríos’ señalado de ser díscolo”, señaló María Victoria Llorente, directora Ideas para la Paz. Según cifras oficiales, las FARC tienen un poco más de 8.000 mil hombres en armas y más de diez mil que actúan como redes de apoyo.