BEST FOREIGN FILMS (ABOUT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES), NOMINATED FOR THE OSCARS

87 Edición de los Oscar (2015) - Películas del 2014

Nominados - Mejor película de habla no inglesa

Preseleccionada Relatos salvajes (2014)  Damián Szifrón Ricardo Darín, Darío Grandinetti, Leonardo Sbaraglia, Érica Rivas, Óscar Martínez, Rita Cortese

Preseleccionada Libertador (2013)  Alberto Arvelo Mendoza Édgar Ramírez, María Valverde, Iwan Rheon, Danny Huston, Gary Lewis, Juana Acosta

Preseleccionada Fuerza Mayor (2014)  Ruben Östlund Johannes Bah Kuhnke, Clara Wettergren, Lisa Loven Kongsli, Vincent Wettergren

Preseleccionada Leviatán (2014)  Andrei Zvyagintsev Vladimir Vdovichenkov, Elena Lyadova, Aleksey Serebryakov, Anna Ukolova, Roman Madyanov, Lesya Kudryashova

Preseleccionada Ida (2013)  Pawel Pawlikowski Agata Kulesza, Agata Trzebuchowska, Joanna Kulig, Dawid Ogrodnik, Jerzy Trela, Adam Szyszkowski

Preseleccionada Accused (2014)  Paula van der Oest Barry Atsma, Amanda Ooms, Marwan Kenzari, Ariane Schluter, Fedja van Huêt, Sallie Harmsen

Preseleccionada Timbuktu (2014)  Abderrahmane Sissako Abel Jafri, Hichem Yacoubi, Kettly Noël, Pino Desperado, Toulou Kiki

Preseleccionada Corn Island (2014)  George Ovashvili Ilyas Salman, Tamer Levent, Mariam Buturishvili

Preseleccionada Tangerines (2013)  Zaza Urushadze Lembit Ulfsak, Giorgi Nakashidze, Misha Meskhi, Elmo Nüganen, Raivo Trass

ACADEMIC OPINIONS ABOUT THE RUBLE`S FALL AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA

Will Russia’s economic turmoil affect its foreign policy?

PONARS Eurasia

Published

12-18-2014

On Wednesday – before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s end of the year news conference – the following question was posed to members of PONARS Eurasia: How is the current financial crisis in Russia likely to affect Putin’s foreign policy choices in the short to mid-term future? Here are the answers:

Vladimir Gel’man, Professor, European University at St.Petersburg and the University of Helsinki:

The foreign policy response of the Russian authorities will depend upon the depth and time frame of financial crisis – at the moment, it not yet reached its apex. At the moment, it is likely that Putin will try to change the rhetoric and go to minor concessions towards Ukraine in order to soften the Western approach. The ultimate goal of this tactics is to wait until the EU sanctions expire in March 2015 and then attempt to restore the previous status quo in Russia-EU affairs which existed until March 2014. It assumes by default that Europeans will forget the annexation of Crimea or at least will not punish Russia for that reason any longer. I would expect that counter-sanctions initiated by the Russian government in August 2014, will be eased or abolished but this will be more or less a symbolic gesture mostly oriented to domestic consumers rather than to European businesses. However, if the economic crisis becomes more severe, then we can expect more serious moves from the Russian side. The Kremlin may allow Kyiv authorities to restore control over Donbass but there is no way to give up Crimea, which will be a long-term pain even for whatever post-Putin government. Still, under Putin the foreign policy of Russia is more or less a projection of domestic affairs. Therefore, a fundamental shift in Russian foreign policy, in essence, would be possible only upon the end of Putin’s rule.

David M. Woodruff, Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science:

Over the past year, Putin’s foreign policy has been anything but predictable. However, the currency panic that broke out this week is more likely to promote efforts to reduce tensions with the West than the opposite.

This week, Russia has confronted a full-blown run on the ruble, with ordinary citizens queuing to buy foreign currency at whatever rates were available and sweeping imported durable goods off store shelves. While falling oil prices naturally tend to push down the ruble’s exchange rate, the currency’s recent plunge reflects panic dynamics, in which virtually all market participants seek alternatives to holding rubles.

Key to the transition from currency slide to outright panic has been the failure of the Russian central bank and the country’s political leaders to send credible signals that they are ready aggressively to defend the ruble’s exchange rate. Sanctions on Russia, and foreign tensions more generally, have contributed to this failure at least three ways:

Fearful of being unable to roll over foreign loans due to sanctions, Russian firms are hoarding their hard-currency holdings to enable their repayment, a trend that policy has done little to combat. Remarkably, Russian banks are still able to borrow rubles from the central bank by pledging foreign currency as collateral, allowing them to speculate on a falling exchange rate.

With little foreign credit available, the central bank has been reluctant to allow domestic monetary policy to tighten. A particularly significant example, held by many to be one trigger for this week’s panic, was the decision last week to increase central bank lending to banks that purchased a large issue of bonds by sanctions-hit Rosneft.

By linking the decline of oil prices and the ruble to foreign efforts to weaken Russia, while defiantly proclaiming that the country has the mettle to weather both, Russia’s leadership has implied that events on the currency market are beyond its control and must simply be endured.

Russia’s central bank and other authorities can and almost certainly will fight what is already a rear-guard action against panic more aggressively than they have to date. However, because important structural weaknesses of Russian exchange-rate policy are rooted in the tense international situation, seeking to ease it will look increasingly attractive on the backdrop of this week’s events.

Kimberly Marten, Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University:

The effect of the financial crisis on Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy is indeterminate.  This is because the key question is whether Putin wishes to stay on and fight to remain in control of the country, or whether he would accept gentle prodding from his closest advisors that it is time for him to go into retirement instead.

If Putin believes he can stay on, fight, and win, then he will never give in to the West. While at this point it would be practically suicidal for him to increase Russia’s military presence in Ukraine and face even tougher sanctions, he is not likely to withdraw the Russian presence, either.  He will be unwilling to provide any fodder for Western claims that “Putin blinked,” because the moment he does so, his time in power is over.  To continue the course right now is an entirely reasonable scenario because the wealth of his closest advisors is probably not held in rubles, but instead in hard currency and real estate abroad.  They can continue to wait for oil prices to eventually stabilize, unless they see the country spiraling down into some sort of domestic unrest.

If things get to the point where domestic unrest looks possible as the winter goes on, then the situation might change in an instant, but the direction of change is unpredictable. If Putin’s closest advisors lose such faith in him that they decide they prefer to go to the side of the Medvedev coalition instead, then Russian foreign policy could become more cooperative. But it is also possible that unrest would lead to the emergence of an ethnic nationalist firebrand.  Russia is in a potentially very dangerous situation right now, and the West should tread softly as a result.

Dmitry Gorenburg, Senior Research Scientist, CNA:

The Russian currency crash on Monday and Tuesday is likely to reduce the chances for Russian leaders to initiate new foreign adventures and may well result in efforts to make a deal on Ukraine. Vladimir Putin and his allies realize that in an economic downturn, they won’t have the financial resources to undertake efforts to destabilize other neighboring states. Instead, we should be looking for Russia to undertake some retrenchment, with Putin to try to calm things down a bit in the hope that he can persuade EU states to allow the sanctions they have in place against Russia to expire. This would allow for market sentiment to improve somewhat, which they hope would allow the ruble to strengthen even if continuing U.S. sectoral sanctions mean that a corporate liquidity crisis is inevitable.

Russian leaders recognize that for European sanctions to end, the conflict in eastern Ukraine needs to be resolved. It is no coincidence that the situation in the Donbas has been calmer in recent days than at any time since last spring. While I imagine that neither the Russian nor European sides at this point know exactly what it would take to call off the sanctions regime, Russian leaders may be hoping that even a partial stabilization of the conflict may be enough to prevent EU member states from reaching consensus on renewing the sectoral and financial sanctions that are particularly economically painful to both sides and that are due to expire in July and August 2015.

Juliet Johnson, Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University:

Despite the hopes of Obama and Kerry, I don’t see this financial crisis changing Russia’s Ukrainian policy. Putin has believed all along that Western sanctions are less about Ukraine than about fostering regime change in Russia. Russia will not give up Crimea. Putin may pull back a bit from eastern Ukraine, but only because he has already achieved his primary goal there – he has created another frozen conflict with long-term destabilizing effects that will make joining NATO or the EU very difficult for Ukraine.  However, the crisis will constrain Putin elsewhere. The new Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, set to launch on January 1, must suddenly be looking much less appealing to its prospective members. More broadly, Russia’s desire to promote its “soft power” as an alternative economic model to the West has gone up in smoke.

Dinissa Duvanova, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Lehigh University:

Watching developments in Russia, I keep wondering why so few analysts are thinking about the positive side of currency devaluation. From an international political economy theoretical perspective, the economic benefits of a weak currency may include a boost to domestic producers, the strengthening of non-energy exports, and an increasing attractiveness of foreign investment into the country.

Are these theoretical expectations relevant to the current liquidity crisis in Russia? I am skeptical about the first expectation, reluctant to see many benefits to Putin’s regime in the second, and somewhat more willing to accept the third one as an important factor in Putin’s future international stance. Lets start with the expected benefits to domestic producers. There is little reason to believe that weak ruble will make much difference because currency depreciation increases attractiveness of energy exports, sending domestic energy prices high. High energy prices (relative to domestic goods) would hurt rather than help domestic manufacturing and prevent economic recovery. Second, as the ruble depreciates, Russian exports traded in local currencies will become more competitive. Given the structure of the Russian economy, however, any future rise in non-energy manufacturing is unlikely to generate sufficient foreign exchange to replace lost oil revenues. I would not bet on this for improving Putin’s economic positions.

Lastly, although under the current sanctions regime and Russia’s increasing hostility to western investment it is unrealistic to expect soaring FDI, the weak ruble will makes it very costly for capital to flee the country. I think this has an important political effect. Over the past several years Putin’s regime made repeated attempts to curtail capital flight and domestically root not only the key members of its “winning coalition,” but also the larger portions of the “electorate.” Still, Russian oligarchs continued to hedge their capitals in foreign assets and Russian professionals frequently traveled abroad. The liquidity crisis significantly reduces both opportunities, which is a goal explicitly pursued by Putin’s regime in the past. On the one hand, as the Russian elites’ fortunes become more dependent on (and vulnerable to) Russian government’s economic policy, the strongmen’s support for Putin’s foreign confrontation with the west may dwindle. This may lead to a relative moderation in Putin’s foreign aggression. Decreasing leverage over Europe’s energy concerns would also help in moderating Putin’s anti-western position. At the same time, I will not be surprised if Putin attempts to intensify his domestic propaganda to turn economic troubles in his favor—with existing mental priors “us vs. them” and decreasing exposure to the outside world, Russian public is likely to rally behind Putin in his fight against the new set of recalcitrant oligarchs, who might push the regime to moderate its foreign policy. If the public rallies behind Putin, a more moderate foreign policy is highly unlikely.

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This post originally appeared at The Monkey Cage.

US & Cuba: A turbulent relationship

VENEZUELA: MANO DURA DE OBAMA SOBRE MADURO

Obama firma una ley que sanciona a altos funcionarios de Venezuela

EE UU da vía libre para que su país sancione a los miembros de la alta jerarquía chavista

ALFREDO MEZA / JOAN FAUS diario el pais, madridCaracas / Washington 19 DIC 2014

Un día después de dar el primer paso para restablecer plenas relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba, su contrincante de siempre en la región, Estados Unidos colocó a Venezuela en la posición de heredar la posta. Lo hizo posible el presidente Barack Obama al firmar este jueves la Ley de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos y la Sociedad Civil de Venezuela 2014, aprobada la semana pasada por el Congreso, que impone sanciones contra funcionarios del Gobierno de Nicolás Maduro considerados responsables de violaciones de derechos humanos en las protestas opositoras suscitadas entre febrero y junio.

En respuesta, Maduro cambió el tono laudatorio con el que celebró el miércoles desde Argentina, donde asistía a la Cumbre del Mercosur, el histórico acuerdo entre La Habana y Washington por uno mucho más frontal. En seis trinos de su cuenta de Twitter resumió la postura de Caracas: son “medidas insolentes” las tomadas por Estados Unidos porque han sido “rechazadas en el país y en el continente” y subestiman “la fuerza y la conciencia del pueblo venezolano”.

No dejó de notar el gobernante venezolano en sus comentarios la paradoja de que la rúbrica de Obama iniciara “una nueva etapa de agresiones a la patria de Bolívar” un día después de la histórica capitulación del régimen castrista. En esa misma línea se expresó el canciller Rafael Ramírez en la red social. “Estamos obligados a movilizarnos y defendernos” y acusó “a la extrema derecha venezolana” de dar “al imperialismo norteamericano un vergonzoso apoyo para agredir a la patria”. De momento Caracas parece no rehuirle al papel que deja vacante su aliada Cuba y ha aceptado el reto que plantea Washington con esta medida.

Este acuerdo se hizo posible justo cuando el Partido Demócrata perdió el control del Senado en las elecciones de noviembre y entendió que era el momento de dejar una impronta en los dos últimos años de mandato de Obama en varios frentes. El Senado -que no pasará a control republicano hasta principios de enero- aprobó el lunes 8 la ley y a los dos días la Cámara de Represenantes -que seguirá bajo dominio republicano- hizo lo mismo.

En un esfuerzo por tratar de construir un relato para nuclear a sus seguidores, Maduro ha tratado de convertir esta decisión en la versión actual del histórico embargo que sancionó Washington contra La Habana hace medio siglo. Está por verse si logra o no su cometido de comunicar que, más que una medida que afecta a funcionarios de su Gobierno, se trata de una agresión a la nación. Por lo pronto ha tenido un éxito relativo en dividir a la oposición. Por iniciativa de la mayoría chavista, el martes la Asamblea Nacional introdujo un proyecto de acuerdo para rechazar las medidas tomadas por el Senado estadounidense.El gesto hacia Cuba es elreconocimiento del fracaso del embargo, pero el endurecimiento mostrado hacia los herederos delfallecido presidente Hugo Chávez es también la prueba de que están dispuestos a ensayar nuevas estrategias para tratar de aislar a gobiernos abiertamente hostiles.

Antes de que el texto se leyera y debatiera en la plenaria fue discutido por los parlamentarios de la Comisión Permanente de Política Exterior, Soberanía e Integración. Dos diputados contrarios al Gobierno —los socialdemócratas William Dávila y Morel Rodríguez— respaldaron la moción chavista. A la plenaria posterior solo se presentaron, y votaron en contra los asambleístas contrarios a la propuesta, para evitar que quedaran en evidencia las fracturas de la alianza opositora cobijada bajo la plataforma de la Mesa de la Unidad.

La firma de Obama estaba prevista desde la aprobación de la norma la semana pasada, pero no llega en un contexto cualquiera. Además del anuncio del progresivo restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas con Cuba, Washington ha rechazado de momento adoptar nuevas represalias contra Rusia por su papel desestabilizador en Ucrania.La decisión llega también en un día particularmente negro para el Gobierno. La agencia Fitch bajó la calificación financiera de Venezuela de “B” a “CCC”, una categoría que designa a los países para los que la suspensión de pagos es una posibilidad real.

La decisión de Obama evidencia la pérdida de paciencia de su Gobierno con Caracas y supone un nuevo deterioro de las tensas relaciones bilaterales. En mayo, Estados Unidos consideraba que imponer sanciones podía ser contraproducente en lograr un acercamiento entre el Gobierno de Nicolás Maduro y la oposición. Tras el fracaso de las conversaciones apadrinadas por el Vaticano y los Gobiernos de Brasil, Colombia y Ecuador, en julio Washington anunciaba la revocación o denegación de visados a un grupo de altos funcionarios venezolanos considerados “responsables o cómplices” de violaciones de derechos humanos en las protestas.

“No hemos permanecido en silencio, ni lo haremos, frente a acciones del Gobierno venezolano que violan los derechos humanos, las libertades fundamentales y las normas democráticas”, afirmó la semana pasada el portavoz de la Casa Blanca, Josh Earnest, tras la aprobación de la norma en el Capitolio.

No se conoce la lista completa de los afectados, pero la semana pasada el senador republicano Marco Rubio publicó algunos nombres. Entre ellos destacan el exdirector de Contrainteligencia Militar y exembajador en Aruba Hugo Carvajal, la fiscal general de la República Luisa Ortega Díaz, los gobernadores chavistas Francisco Rangel Gómez, José Gregorio Vielma Mora, Alexis Ramírez y Henry Rangel Silva, el extitular de Interior, Justicia y Paz Miguel Rodríguez Torres, así como la plana mayor de la Guardia Nacional Bolivariana, responsables de reprimir las manifestaciones.

En tono de ironía otros prominentes funcionarios de Gobierno reclamaron que los incluyeran entre los sancionados. Otros, como la ministra de Asuntos Penitenciarios Iris Valera, plantearon incluso una quema masiva de las visas de turistas necesarias para ingresar a territorio estadounidense en plazas públicas del país.

CUBA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS EN PAZ

Bastante tardíamente, tras 25 años de la caída del Muro de Berlín, se terminaron años de negociación secreta entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, con el cierre del ominoso u nada efectivo capítulo del embargo e intercambio de prisioneros políticos y espías. La principal fuente de legitimación externa del régimen acaba de desaparecer y de aquí en más, los hermanos Castro ya no podrán justificar la larga agonía de su moribundo régimen, invocando al asedio del "Imperio". Al mismo tiempo, dejan a la deriva, discursos similares de la región latinoamericana, sobre todo, los de la otrora "hermana" Venezuela, que pasa a quedar virtualmente aislada en su retórica anti-Washington. No resulta útil detenerse en las razones que condujeron a esta negociación que termina en el deshielo de los vínculos. Si Obama es un "lame duck" y por ello, pudo culminar este proceso, porque no tiene nada que perder o porque elimine un tema de agenda álgido para las elecciones de 2016, allanándole el camino a Hillary o, porque los Castro necesitaban este levantamiento, para completar su tarea de liberalización tímidamente iniciada con el ocaso y retiro de Fidel. Sean cuales fueren ésas u otras causas, se trata de una buena noticia. Al ritmo de la Perestroika gorbachoviana en su momento, toda apertura o descongelamiento, resulta bienvenido porque abre esperanzas de cambio, interno y externo, sin importar tanto el contenido de dicha alteración, que también está abierta. Si Estados Unidos -pero también la región-, ayudan de manera inteligente en la transición cubana, todo el proceso evitará errores vistos en Rusia y Europa del Este. Para Cuba, queda una agenda dificultosa, porque su sociedad civil deberá aprender a vivir en libertad con el paso del tiempo. Seis décadas fueron suficientes para destruirla pero todos sabemos que lleva mucho más tiempo, ejercerla de manera responsable. Para Obama, la lección es sencillamente, un "se puede". En efecto, el recientemente Presidente derrotado en las urnas parlamentarias, podía ejercer autoridad sobre los nefastos lobbies furiosamente anticastristas y antidemocráticos de Miami, como puede hacerlo -y aún no lo hace-, sobre los lobbies judío o polacos que realizan la misma presión para apañar a Israel o castigar a Rusia alternativamente, en todo lo que hacen y omiten hacer. Ojalá su ejemplo lo ayude a confiar más en sí mismo, en el bienio que queda. Para España, Canadá y el propio Papa Francisco, también el éxito de la operación de pacificación es un ejemplo más de que la diplomacia multilateral, puede resultar eficaz. Para Cuba y los Castro, habrá que estar atentos. Se abrió una nueva "Caja de Pandora". Tal vez, como me dijo un profesor isleño amigo hace un par de meses aquí en Argentina, el 2016 será el año clave para la tan ansiada democratización de la isla, pero el año próximo puede dar el puntapié inicial.